Abstract Securing different online e-business activities usually requires applying different cryptographic algorithms. The proxy signcryption algorithms are designed for applications such as online proxy auction or online proxy signatures on business contracts, which require a proxy agent to sign on confidential messages. This paper proposes a proxy credential forgery attack to two recent proxy signcryption schemes in the literature. Using the attack, a malicious proxy signer can create a fake proxy credential from his original credential to extend his signing power. Simple modifications to these two schemes are also provided in this paper to prevent the attack without adding too much computational complexity. In addition to the contribution of introducing a new type of attacks to signcryption schemes, the paper also points out that, while designing a secure proxy signcryption scheme, not only the unforgeability of proxy signatures is important, but also that of proxy credentials as well.
to protect message confidentiality. Following Zheng's paper, some other signcryption schemes [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] were also proposed in literature. In these proxy signcryption schemes, the original signer creates a cryptographically protected proxy credential and gives it to a proxy signer. Based on the proxy credential, the proxy signer can sign and encrypt a message on behalf of the original signer and then send it to the signature verifier. During or after a signing process, a conflict (either the original signer denies his proxy delegation, or a proxy signer denies his proxy signature) may occur. If the honest party in a conflict is able to provide verifiable evidences, the proxy signcryption scheme is non-repudiated. To resolve a conflict, it needs a trusted judge to verify the provided evidences. Section 2.2 describes these possible conflicts, the verifiable evidences, and conflict resolving procedures.
In this paper, we proposed a Proxy Credential Forgery (PCF) attack to two proxy signcryption schemes, which are the LWHY scheme (proposed by Lin et al. in 2010) [16] and the EA scheme (proposed by Elkamchouchi and Aboueleoud in 2007) [17] . Using the PCF attack, these two schemes can be compromised and fail to preserve the non-repudiation property. That is, a malicious proxy signer is able to create a fake proxy credential to enlarge/extend his signing power in these two schemes and the fake proxy credential can pass the verification checks. The proposed PCF attack is general and can be used to attack either proxy signature or signcryption schemes if the schemes have similar proxy credential generation (PCG) algorithms as LWHY's and EA's. At the end of the paper, some simple modifications to these two schemes are provided to avoid such attack.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the proxy signcryption security model and defines the proxy credential forgery attack. Section 3 gives the mathematical background of the bilinear pairing, which is the underlying cryptosystem used to build the LWHY and the EA proxy signcryption schemes. Section 4 briefly describes the LWHY scheme and proposes how to attack the scheme by forging the proxy credential. Similarly in Sect. 5, the EA scheme is described and then the PCF attack to the scheme is presented. Section 6 proposes the improvement to both the LWHY and the EA schemes so that the modified schemes are secure against the attack. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Proxy signcryption security model
To secure applications such as online proxy auction or business contract signing by an authorized proxy, it requires using an proxy signcryption scheme to ensure some security goals. Before itemizing these security requirements, this section will first describe the proxy signcryption processing model such as who are the involved parties and what are their roles in the process.
Proxy signcryption process and involved parties
In an proxy signcryption application, usually it will have four parties involved. The original signer U o delegates his signing power to a proxy signer U p to sign and encrypt a message to a designated signature verifier U v . If there is a conflict occurred, a trusted judge U j will resolve the conflict by verifying the evidences presented by the conflicting parties.
In general, there are five phases for a proxy signcryption scheme. They are -Setup: A key generation center (KGC) chooses a cryptosystem, picks some system parameters param and then make these parameters public. In some schemes, the KGC generates the public-private key pairs for all participants, whereas in other schemes, each participant chooses his own public-private key pair based on the public param. -PCG: In this phase, the original signer U o is responsible to generate the proxy credential. The PCG algorithm takes as input of the private key of U o and outputs a proxy credential to the proxy signer U p . -Proxy credential verification (PCV): Upon receiving the proxy credential, the proxy signer U p should verify the validity of the credential. The PCV algorithm takes as input of the credential and the original signer's public key and then outputs a boolean value indicating either "pass" or "fail". -Signcrypted message generation (SMG): With a valid proxy credential, the proxy signer U p is capable of signcrypting a message m to the designated signature verifier U v . The SMG algorithm takes as input of the plaintext m, the proxy credential, the private key of U p and the public key of U v . It outputs a signcrypted message δ. -Signature recovery and verification (SRV): After receiving the signcrypted message δ, the signature verifier U v should recover the message and signature and then verify the validity of the signature. The SRV algorithm takes as input the signcrypted message δ, the private key of U v , and the public keys of U o and U p . It outputs a plaintext m and accepts a recovered proxy signature if δ is valid. Otherwise, an error is reported.
Security requirement
A proxy signcryption scheme must satisfy two non-repudiation security requirement.
-Proxy credential non-repudiation: If an original signer U o did create and give a proxy credential to a proxy signer U p , U o cannot deny his delegation later. To achieve this requirement, the scheme must 1. provide a correct PCV algorithm that the validity of the credential can be publicly checked, given the credential and U o 's public key as input. 2. ensure the proxy credential unforgeability (PCNF) property. To be more specific, the scheme needs to ensure that nobody, except the original signer U o or the KGC, is able to generate a valid proxy credential. That is, adversaries cannot generate a fake credential and pass the PCV test.
In case an original signer U o later denies a proxy credential held by a proxy signer U p , the resolving procedure is as follows: 1. The trusted judge U j asks U p to present the proxy credential. 2. If the provided credential passes the PCV test,the judge identifies the dishonesty of U o on denying his own delegation. Otherwise, U p is considered dishonest on using a false credential.
-Signcrypted message non-repudiation: If a proxy signer did signcrypt a message to a signature verifier U v , U p cannot deny his signature later. Again, to achieve this non-repudiation property, it requires the scheme to 1. provide a correct SMG algorithm that securely encrypts both the proxy signature and message. 2. provide a correct SRV algorithm that is able to recover and verify the validity of both the proxy signature and message. 3. ensure the signcrypted messages unforgeability property. Or in other words, the scheme needs to ensure that nobody but the proxy signer U p is able to generate the signcrypted message and pass the SRV test.
If a proxy signer U p later denies a proxy signature held by a designated recipient U v , the resolving procedure is as follows:
1. The trusted judge U j asks U v to present the recovered message and proxy signature from the signcrypted message. 2. With provided evidences, the judge can then use the SRV algorithm to check the validity of the signature. If the checking succeeds, U p is dishonest on denying his own signature. Otherwise, the signature presented by U v is invalid.
Adversary types
Based on different knowledge, there are four types of adversaries. For each type of adversary, we give some possible malicious actions from the adversary if the underlying proxy signcryption scheme is not properly designed to prevent them.
- 
PCF attack
The proposed PCF attack in this paper is a type II attack, i.e., an attack from a malicious proxy signer U p . Before providing examples of the attack in Sections 4 and 5, let us define the attack first.
Definition
The PCF attack is an attack from a proxy signer, with the knowledge of an existing proxy credential, public parameters of the the underlying cryptosystem, and the public keys of all involved parties, who can maliciously create a fake proxy credential to pass the PCV test.
Cryptographic background: bilinear pairings
Bilinear pairing is a popular cryptosystem used recently in some efficient encryption or signature/signcryption schemes [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . We will briefly describe the bilinear pairings in this section. Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ×) be two cyclic groups of the same prime order q, B be the generator of the additive group G 1 , and e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map if it has the following properties:
2. Non-degeneracy: If B is a generator of G 1 , then e(B, B) is a generator of G 2 . 3. Computability: ∀D, E ∈ G 1 , there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to efficiently compute e(D, E).
In general, most cryptographic schemes based on bilinear maps rely on the bilinear variants of Diffie-Hellman hard problems as follows:
Currently no known algorithm is available to solve them efficiently.
LWHY scheme and the PCF attack
This section gives a brief review of the LWHY scheme and then describes the PCF attack to the scheme. The LWHY scheme has five phases: setup, PCG, PCV, SMG, and SRV. If a signer, either U o or U p , later denies a signature, a trusted judge will be asked to identify the dishonest party.
Setup
Given a security parameter k, a trusted KGC selects two cyclic groups (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ×) of the same prime order q where |q| = 2 k . Let B be a generator of order q over G 1 and e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map. The KGC also chooses three collision-free hash functions:
Each user U i chooses a private key x i ∈ Z q and a public key
PCG
U o delegates his signing power to U p , specifying the detail of the delegation in a warrant m w . For example, it may include the identities of U o , U p and U v , as well as the expiration date of this delegation. U o chooses a secret random number d ∈ Z q and then computes
The proxy credential C = (σ, N , m w ) will be sent to U p .
PCV
Upon receiving the proxy credential C from U o , the proxy signer U p verifies its validity by performing the following PCV test:
According to LWHY's paper, it is claimed the credential is valid if Eq. (7) holds since
SMG
After the proxy credential is verified, U p signcrypts a message m on behalf of U o . U p chooses a secret random number r ∈ Z q and computes
where E v () denotes a symmetric encryption function with a share secret key v between U p and U v . Then U p delivers the signcrypted message δ = (R, , , N , m w ) to the recipient U v .
SRV
U v receives the signcrypted message δ from U p . U v first computes
since
Thus, the computation of Eq. (13) can recover the original generated from Eq. (10) by U p . With , U v can recover the message m since
U v then recovers S from the received by
where D v () is the symmetric decryption function with the key v. Finally, U v verifies the proxy signature by performing the following SRV test:
Since 
U p generates a fake proxy credential
A malicious U p can increase his signing power without a proper delegation from U o , such as extending the expiration date of the warrant or adding additional signature recipients into the warrant, by forging a fake proxy credential (σ , N , m w ) from the original (σ, N , m w ) that he received from U o before. U p chooses a fake proxy warrant m w (with the extended signing power) and then computes the corresponding σ and N as follows:
Now, U p picks a random number r ∈ Z q and uses the fake σ to compute R , S , , , as Eq. (8) to Eq. (12) . That is,
and sends the signcrypted message δ = (R , , , N , m w ) to U v .
Pass SRV
Upon receiving the fake signcrypted message, U v performs the procedure as described from Eq. (13) to Eq. (16) and will not detect the forgery of the signcrypted message. m, R ) 
Failure of resolving repudiation
The original signer U o later finds out the signature from the proxy signer U p is not delegated by him and asks a trusted judge to resolve the conflict. The judge first asks U v to present the converted proxy signature (S , R , N ) and (m, m w ), and then performs the SRV test in Eq. (16). As described in the previous section, the verification will succeed and the judge realizes that the proxy signature was indeed signed by U p . Next, the judge will ask U p to present the proxy credential he received from U o . The malicious U p can simply present the forged credential (σ , N , m w ) to the judge. The forged credential can falsely fool the judge to believe U p is innocent since the checking of the PCV test in Eq. (7) will succeed as follows:
EA scheme and the PCF attack
The EA scheme is a proxy identity-based signcryption scheme. It also has the same five phases as the LWHY scheme.
Setup
Given security parameters k and n, the KGC chooses two cyclic groups (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ×) of prime order q, a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , a generator B of G 1 , a master secret s ∈ Z * q , a secure symmetric encryption algorithm (E, D) such as AES, a system public key
and collision-free hash functions 
where both Y i and X i ∈ G 1 . The key pair will be sent to the user in a secure channel.
PCG
U o generates a proxy credential to delegate his signing power. U o first chooses a secret random number d ∈ Z q and compute
The proxy credential C = (σ, N ) is then sent to U p .
PCV
U p verifies the validity of the received credential by performing the following PCV test: 
U p sends the signcrypted message δ = (c, a, S, N ) to U v .
SRV
Upon receiving the signcrypted message δ = (c, a, S, N ) from U p , U v first recovers k 1 by computing U v then recovers k 2 by computing
since 
5.6 The PCF attack to the EA scheme Unlike the LWHY scheme, the EA scheme does not have a proxy warrant. Thus, the motivation of U p to forge the proxy credential will not be extending his proxy signing power. However, a malicious U p can forge a credential and secretly give it to another person U p without the agreement of the original signer U o . With the forged credential, U p can proxy signcrypted a message to U v on behalf of U o , though he does not have a proper delegation from U o .
U p generates a fake proxy credential
The Malicious U p can use his proxy credential C = (σ, N ) to generate a fake proxy credential C = (σ , N ). U p first picks a random number d ∈ Z q and then computes
where
U p can unlawfully give the fake proxy credential C to a third person U p . Based on the fake C , U p can randomly pick a number r ∈ Z * q and signcrypt a message δ = (c , a , S , N ) to U v by computing Eq. (30) to Eq. (34), that is,
Pass SRV
Upon receiving the fake signcrypted message (c , a , S , N ) , U v performs the SRV process as described in Sect. 5.5. He recovers both k 1 and k 2 using Eqs. (35) and (36) but with inputs from the fake δ . The recovery will be successful since e(B, r s B − a (sY o + d s B))e(s B, a (Y o + N )) −by Eqs. (24), (26 and 43), that is how a was first generated by U p .
Failure of resolving repudiation
U o later discovers that the proxy signcrypted message generated by U p does not have his proxy delegation. He will ask a trusted judge to decide who is dishonest. The judge first asks U v to present the signcrypted message δ = (c , a , S , N ) and check the validity of the message. It will pass the SRV test as described in the previous section and the judge concludes that U v is honestly presenting a valid proxy signcrypted message.
Next, the judge needs to decide either U o or U p is dishonest. He asks U p to present the proxy credential he received from U o . The forged credential C = (σ , N ) presented by U p will pass the PCV test in Eq. (29) 
−by Eqs. (24), (38)
Prevention of PCF attacks
This paper gave two examples of the PCF attack to the LWHY and the EA schemes. The same attack can be applied to other proxy signature/signcryption schemes if they do not satisfy the PCNF property described in Sect. 2.2. Actually, we have found another proxy signature scheme [23] which is also insecure against the proposed PCF attack, where a malicious signature verifier can generate a fake signature on a different message m from a signature of m. To save the page size, we do not include the discussion of this scheme in the paper. This section discusses how to modify both the LWHY and the EA schemes to prevent the attack. In most of the proxy signature/signcryption schemes, the original signer U o creates a proxy credential with some embedded secrets such as a random number and the U o 's private key. The proxy signer U p can then use U o 's public key to verify that the credential is indeed constructed from U o 's private key without revealing the embedded secrets.
In both the LWHY and the EA schemes, there are two major components N and σ in the proxy credential. These two components need to match each other, i.e., only a matched pair can pass the PCV test. However, the matching relationship between N and σ is easy to re-produce in the LWHY and the EA schemes. The PCF attack presented in this paper re-produces the matching relationship to a fake pair N and σ from the original pair N and σ . This is why both schemes are vulnerable to the PCF attacks.
Thus, the prevention of the PCF attacks must focus on making it difficult to reproduce the matching relationship of N and σ . From Eqs. (5) and (6) in the LWHY scheme and Eqs. (27) and (28) in the EA scheme, we can see that both N and σ are constructed using the same random secret d and that is the only matching requirement. If we are able to add an extra matching requirement between N and σ , the proposed PCF attack can be prevented. Our approach is to add the component N into the construction of the other component σ . The details of the modification to the LWHY and the EA schemes are described in the following two sections.
Modification to the LWHY scheme
A simple and practical modification to the LWHY scheme is to change the credential (σ, N , m w ) generation to
where d ∈ Z q is a randomly picked one-time secret number and [N ] x is the xcoordinate of the point N ∈ G 1 . In addition, the PCV test in Eq. (7) should be changed to
For message signcryption and SRV, no change is required since the proposed attack only targets at the PCG. Now, let us show how the PCV works in the modified LWHY scheme. Upon receiving a proxy credential (σ, N , m w ) from U o , the proxy signer U p verifies the credential using the PCV test in Eq. (47). If the test returns true, the credential is valid since
Secure against the PCF attack
Proposition 1 below shows that the modified LWHY scheme is secure against the PCF attack proposed in Sect. 4.6.
Proposition 1
The PCF attack proposed in Sect. 4.6 will not be successful in the modified LWHY scheme.
Proof Applying the same PCF attack to the modified scheme, the malicious proxy signer U p generates a fake proxy warrant m w to extend his signing power. Based on his/her original credential (σ, N , m w ), he computes
The fake credential (σ , N , m w ), which passes the PCV test in the original LWHY scheme, will not pass the PCV test, defined in Eq. (47), in the modified LWHY scheme since 
The modified scheme only changes the PCG and its verification in the LWHY scheme. The message signcryption, recovery, and verification procedures are not modified. Thus, the security proofs of their scheme in [16] against IND-CCA2 (confidentiality against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks) and EF-CMA (unforgeability against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks) can be directly applied to the modified scheme.
Added computational complexity
For the computational complexity, the modified LWHY scheme only adds a few operations to the credential generation and to the credential verification, where these two processes are required only at the time a new proxy delegation from U o to U p occurs. Comparing to the bilinear pairing operations in the more frequent signcryption generation, recovery, and verification processes, the added operations are not significant. Table 1 gives the required operations in both LWHY and the modified LWHY scheme, where M m , H, P m , P a , I, E/D, and B p represent the modular multiplication in Z q , hashing, point multiplication in G 1 , point addition in G 1 , inversion in Z q , symmetric encryption/decryption, and bilinear pairing operations, respectively. The computational complexities of modular addition in Z q and bitwise XOR operations are insignificant, comparing to the operations listed above. Thus, these two operations will not be included in the complexity analysis. There are three kinds of hash functions used: h 1 , h 2 , and h 3 in the LWHY scheme. They are comparable to each other in terms of efficiency. Thus, for simplicity, we just count the number of hash operations without further differentiating them in Table 1 .
A blank entry in Table 1 means that no corresponding operation is required in both schemes. The entries with bold numbers indicate that the modified LWHY scheme needs more operations than the LWHY scheme does. If the practical elliptic curve E/F 3 163 is used to implement the group G 1 , according to the best result in [24] , one bilinear pairing (B p ) operation is about 11, 110 modular multiplications (M m ) in F 3 163, while a point multiplication (P m ) of E/F 3 163 is just a few hundred modular multiplications in F 3 163. Thus, comparing to the required B p operations in both schemes, the added one M m and one P m operations in the modified LWHY scheme is insignificant.
Modification to the EA scheme
To prevent the PCF attack, we also propose a modified EA scheme using the same approach used in the modified LWHY scheme. The proxy credential (σ, N ) generation of the EA scheme in Eqs. (27) and (28) will be modified to
The corresponding PCV test in Eq. (29) also needs to change to e(B, σ )
The modified EA scheme does not require to change the signcrypted message generation procedure from the EA scheme. That is, the modified EA scheme still uses Eq. (30) to Eq. (34) to generate a signcrypted message.
However, the SRV procedures of the original EA scheme do need to be modified. In the modified EA scheme, after receiving a signcrypted message (c, a, S, N ) from U p , the signature verifier U v recovers k 1 and k 2 using Eqs. (53) and (54), respectively. 
Equations (53) and (54) 
Secure against the PCF attack
The modified EA scheme is secure against the PCF attack proposed in Sect. 5.6. In the PCF attack to the original EA scheme, the malicious U p creates a fake credential (σ , N ) from the original credential (σ, N ) and then give it to another person U p who has no proper delegation from U o . Proposition 2 shows this attack will not be successful in the modified EA scheme.
Proposition 2
The PCF attack proposed in Sect. 5.6 will not be successful in the modified EA scheme.
Proof Applying the same attack to the modified EA scheme, the malicious U p picks a random number d ∈ Z q and then computes Table 2 gives all required operations in both schemes.
Conclusion
The non-repudiation of a proxy signature/signcryption of a message, from a proxy signer to a signature verifier, is usually the main focus in many schemes. In this paper, we point out that the non-repudiation of a proxy credential, from an original signer to a proxy signer, is important as well by presenting a proxy credential forgery attack to two recent proxy signcryption schemes. The paper also proposes possible modifications to the two schemes so that the improved schemes are secure against the attack.
